Hostek is putting their customers at risk

If you are hosting your site at Hostek.com, you are probably at a higher risk of being hacked. Why? Because they do not do the proper separation of accounts internally, so anyone can access the pages of everyone else.

How do we know that? We were helping a friend with his site over there and when we checked their permissions, we found a big (BIG) security hole on Hostek. Every PHP script is executed with the permissions of the user “nobody” (used by Apache), and every site allows the user “nobody” to access its files.

It means that any user can access the files from everyone else. Even worse, you can add and even modify the files under some circumstances.

Analysis

When we realized that the PHP scripts were being executed as the user nobody, we did a simple PHP script to verify that:

echo “verify..\n”;
$myloc = `pwd`;
echo “myloc: $myloc\n”;
$myid = `id`;
echo “myid: $myid\n
“;

We got this output:

verify.. myloc: /home/XXX/public_html done
myid: uid=99(nobody) gid=99(nobody) groups=99(nobody)

Uh-oh, the PHP script is being executed as nobody. We also learned that probably every user has its own home directory at /home/[user] and their public web site is stored at /home/[user]/public_html.

We tried an additional check after with this script:

$listofusers = `cat /etc/passwd`;
echo "

users:$listofusers\n

“;

And yes, we got the list of all the users inside their shared server ( I won’t list the real users to protect them, but everyone had the home dir at /home/[user] and the shell /usr/local/cpanel/bin/noshell):

…
users:root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin
daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin
adm:x:3:4:adm:/var/adm:/sbin/nologin
lp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/sbin/nologin
sync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync
shutdown:x:6:0:shutdown:/sbin:/sbin/shutdown
halt:x:7:0:halt:/sbin:/sbin/halt
mail:x:8:12:mail:/var/spool/mail:/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:13:news:/etc/news:
uucp:x:10:14:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/sbin/nologin
operator:x:11:0:operator:/root:/sbin/nologin
games:x:12:100:games:/usr/games:/sbin/nologin
gopher:x:13:30:gopher:/var/gopher:/sbin/nologin
ftp:x:14:50:FTP User:/var/ftp:/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:99:99:Nobody:/:/sbin/nologin
dbus:x:81:81:System message bus:/:/sbin/nologin
vcsa:x:69:69:virtual console memory owner:/dev:/sbin/nologin
rpm:x:37:37::/var/lib/rpm:/sbin/nologin
haldaemon:x:68:68:HAL daemon:/:/sbin/nologin
netdump:x:34:34:Network Crash Dump user:/var/crash:/bin/bash
nscd:x:28:28:NSCD Daemon:/:/sbin/nologin
sshd:x:74:74:Privilege-separated SSH:/var/empty/sshd:/sbin/nologin
rpc:x:32:32:Portmapper RPC user:/:/sbin/nologin
rpcuser:x:29:29:RPC Service User:/var/lib/nfs:/sbin/nologin
nfsnobody:x:65534:65534:Anonymous NFS User:/var/lib/nfs:/sbin/nologin
mailnull:x:47:47::/var/spool/mqueue:/sbin/nologin
smmsp:x:51:51::/var/spool/mqueue:/sbin/nologin
pcap:x:77:77::/var/arpwatch:/sbin/nologin
named:x:25:25:Named:/var/named:/sbin/nologin
mysql:x:100:101:MySQL server:/var/lib/mysql:/bin/bash
mailman:x:32001:32001::/usr/local/cpanel/3rdparty/mailman:/bin/bash
cpanel:x:32002:32003::/usr/local/cpanel:/bin/bash
..

That’s not too bad. What else could we do? Well, we could list the files from everyone else (I won’t show how to do it):

/home/userB/public_html

total 1524
drwxr-x---  24 userB nobody    4096 Oct 30 01:49 .
drwx--x--x  15 userB actionin  4096 Apr 26  2009 ..
-rw-------   1 userB actionin    16 Apr 11 03:57 .ftpquota
-rw-r--r--   1 userB actionin    93 Feb  3  2009 LiveSearchSiteAuth.xml
-rw-r--r--   1 userB actionin  3240 Feb 10  2009 about.php
drwxr-xr-x   2 userB actionin  4096 Nov 30  2007 activate
drwxr-xr-x   7 userB actionin  4096 Mar 10  2009 admin
-rw-r--r--   1 userB actionin  6243 Feb  5  2009 change_password.php
..

As you can see, the group nobody has the permission to read and execute the public_html directory, so every user can read the files from everyone else.

If that wasn’t bad enough, we were able to cat the passwords from wp-config.php (used by WordPress), configuration.php (used by Joomla) and even .htpasswd used to protect specific directories.

Can it get worse?

What is really bad is that some CMSs (specially Worpdress), have a directory to allow the user to upload files in there via the web. With WordPress it is inside wp-content/upload.

The permissions of this directory allowed the user nobody to add and modify any file in there. So we were able to add files into other people’s site (see test.txt on the screenshot) and even modify anything they had uploaded. Really bad.

And yes, we contacted them and got no reply.